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Largest Carbon Market 
 
Abstract 
We examine the world’s largest carbon exchange, ICE’s ECX, by applying Chordia et al.’s (2008) 
conception of short-horizon return predictability as an inverse indicator of market efficiency. We 
find a strong relationship between liquidity and market efficiency such that when spreads narrow, 
return predictability diminishes. This is more pronounced for the highest trading carbon futures 
and during periods of low liquidity. Since the start of trading in Phase II of the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) prices have continuously moved nearer to unity with, efficient, 
random walk benchmarks, and this improves from year to year. Overall, our findings suggest 
trading quality in the EU-ETS has improved markedly and matures over the 2008-2011 
compliance years.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a strengthening consensus that climate change is occurring and that human activities are, 
at least partly, to blame.  Policies on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are at the forefront of 
government responses and, as noted by Stern (2008, p23) “At the heart of good policy will be a 
price for GHG’s”.  An important mechanism to price emissions is a cap and trade scheme, in 
which a central authority limits total pollution but allows the rights to pollute to be traded. 
 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) is the largest compulsory pseudo-cap and trade 
scheme in the world.   The operation and success of the scheme will significantly inform the 
direction of global climate policy, identifying effective mechanisms for carbon trading and the 
effect of different restrictions on the price of emissions.  The scheme may also affect the growth 
 of the emission-constrained economies in Europe, New Zealand and parts of the United States 
and Japan.1  
 
The market is artificial, dependent on environmental policy and regulation and therefore exposed 
to greater levels of uncertainty than is the case for most ‘natural’ commodities.  Emissions 
permits have to be surrendered on an annual basis.  In principle, therefore, futures contracts on 
emissions permits offer a significant benefit as both instruments for hedging price risk and as a 
mechanism to assist in the smooth operation of the system as a whole.   
Understanding the microstructure of these markets therefore goes a long way in helping inform 
global climate change policy. The contribution this paper makes to global policy, when viewed in 
this light, can therefore be considered important.  The EU-ETS platforms operate like regular 
financial platforms and hence provide the avenue for assessing the relevant microstructure issues 
by employing established methodology from the finance literature. 
 
As market participants require time to incorporate new information into their trading strategies, 
a market deemed efficient over a daily horizon does not necessarily translate into a market that is 
efficient at every point during the day (see for example Fama, 1970; Epps, 1979; Hillmer and Yu, 
1979; Patell and Wolfson, 1984; Chordia et al., 2008). Confirmation of this notion is available in 
the contributions of Cushing and Madhavan (2000) and Chordia et al. (2005) showing that short-
run returns can be predicted from order flows. However Chordia et al. (2008) find that this 
predictability diminishes with improving market liquidity and across different tick size regimes 
on the NYSE. Similarly Chung and Hrazdil (2010a) confirm the diminishing predictability 
proposition in a large sample analysis of NASDAQ stocks. These two studies thus provide 
                                                          
1 Regulatory arbitrage is likely to be greater when carbon trading has a smaller geographic application.  It is also 
noteworthy that the effect of EU-ETS legislation is now apparent globally as airlines doing business in the EU are 
now subject to EU-ETS regulations, this came into effect in January 2012. However, there is a temporary 
suspension placed on the involvement of flights between EU and non-EU states 
 evidence of strong relations between liquidity and market efficiency through the impact of 
liquidity on the predictability of returns from order flows.  
 
Instead of using order imbalance, a separate group of studies examine the connection between 
liquidity and returns through the demand for premia when transacting in illiquid instruments. 
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) find a positive cross-sectional relationship between stock returns 
and liquidity risks. Their results are underscored by similar findings from Datar et al. (1998) and 
Acharya and Pederson (2005). Similarly, Amihud (2002) document evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that expected market liquidity provides an indication of stock excess return in the 
time series, implying that the excess return to some extent typifies an illiquidity premium. Chang 
et al. (2010) also find a consistent narration on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
 
Chordia et al. (2008) make an insightful argument for the relatedness of market efficiency to 
market liquidity. Consider market makers in a hypothetical market struggling to sustain liquidity 
supply. This may be as a result of financial difficulties or over-exposure to untenable positions. 
Market makers may be relatively sensitive to significant buy orders for example, or an imbalance 
between buy and sell orders may imply that trading is taking place on the basis of private 
information.  In any case, when such a scenario exists, pricing strain caused by arriving order 
flows potentially forces a brief deviation of prices from their underlying worth (hence 
inefficiency; see Fama, 1970). Thus order flow can give an indication of instrument returns, at 
least over short intervals (see also Stoll, 1978; Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 2004). Experienced 
and vigilant market participants (perhaps trading with algorithms during a significant proportion 
of the time) are likely to notice at least some of these deviations from random walk benchmarks. 
They are likely to tender market orders with the aim of profiting from the arbitrage. The choice 
of market orders is informed by the need to quickly profit before the arbitrage opportunity 
disappears, as this would most likely be fleeting. Strangely enough, the submitted orders from the 
 arbitrageurs, assuming they are made in ample volumes and on time, are the ones that would lead 
to relieving the pressure on the market makers inventories. This then leads to the rapid 
correction of the asset prices. According to Chordia et al. (2005), the correction in asset prices 
decreases return predictability. Since arbitrage traders are more likely to tender these orders when 
the spreads are narrow (see for example Peterson and Sirri, 2002; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 
1998 for the influence of liquidity on trading tactics), one would expect reduced return 
predictability when the market is more liquid and experiences more activity of arbitrage traders 
than otherwise.  We investigate this hypothesis in a unique market created as a result of climate 
change policy, the EU-ETS.2  
 
Based on the foregoing hypothesis, we examine the links between liquidity and market efficiency 
on the largest emissions trading platform in the world, the European Climate Exchange in 
London, using mainly the short horizon order imbalance and return predictability regressions 
methodology of Chordia et al. (2008). We find as follows: (i) Intraday return predictability is 
significantly reduced when the traded instruments are relatively more liquid, hence short horizon 
market efficiency is incontrovertibly associated with daily liquidity robustness tests and variance 
ratio analysis also contribute to this conclusion; (ii) instrument trading efficiency and by 
extension market efficiency improves as the market evolves/matures over a forty month period; 
(iii) the ECX instruments tested show improvement in terms of conformity with random walk 
benchmarks with each successive compliance period. Overall, this paper concludes that the 
carbon market has achieved a comparable informational efficiency in relation to long established 
financial markets.  
 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: In the next section we provide the 
background to the study by discussing the EU-ETS and summarizing the literature on market 
                                                          
2 Our approach is clearly different from the spot-futures relationship approach usually adopted for measuring 
futures market efficiency (see for example Kellard et al., 1999). 
 efficiency and transaction costs in the EU-ETS. Section 3 discusses sample selection and 
describes the data. Section 4 reports our econometric methodology and the empirical findings, 
and finally Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background to this study 
2.1. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) 
The Kyoto Protocol, an international accord on climate change, came into force in January 2005 
and provides mechanisms through which participating countries can achieve their emissions 
reduction targets. Under the treaty, the EU undertakes to reduce its emissions to 8% below the 
1990 levels, mainly by employing the International Emissions Trading (IET) mechanism, which 
is designed as the EU-ETS. Details of this are described further below.  The greenhouse gas 
permit trading market has since grown into a multi-billion dollar market with Europe leading the 
charge. The European emissions permit market has accounted for more than 95% of market 
share for any given year since 20063 (see Kossoy and Ambrosi, 2010; Linacre et al., 2011). This is 
however set to change as New Zealand, municipal and state governments in Japan and the 
United States have all in recent years commenced operating similar schemes and Australia is set 
to start in 2015 after the adoption of its own climate change legislation in 2011. The Australian 
scheme will be linked with EU-ETS as from 2015. 
 
The EU-ETS is divided into three phases; the first phase, the so-called Phase I (2005-2007) was a 
largely inefficient trial period (see Montagnoli and de Vries, 2010 for example) before the 
commencement of the actual Kyoto commitment period (Phase II; 2008-2012). Phase II forms 
the basis of our investigations. The EU has committed to a post-Kyoto phase (Phase III, 2013-
2020). This commitment has been supported by a global climate agreement reached in Durban in 
                                                          
3 The concept of permit trading is not novel to the Kyoto Protocol or the EU-ETS however, the most prominent 
example of emissions trading until recently has been the United States Acid Rain programme. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has employed emissions trading as a policy tool to achieve emissions reductions since 
1992. 
 December 2011. The Durban meeting also raises expectations with respect to the achievement 
of future global climate change agreements (see Ranson and Stavins, 2012). The EU-ETS 
operates as a cap and trade while allowing the use of certain external emissions permit 
instruments through the EU Linking Directive 2004/101/EC (see Flåm, 2007). This is the main 
driver for the EU’s emissions reduction target of 8% below 1990 levels over the Kyoto 
commitment years. The EU adopts a ‘burden sharing agreement’ (Council Decision 
2002/358/CE) allowing it to re-allocate emissions reduction targets within its member states so as 
to allow emissions growth in less developed EU countries. Within its Kyoto target, the EU thus 
allocates individual targets to its constituent nations. This means more demanding targets for the 
larger European economies such as Germany than for the smaller ones. It then falls on the 
member countries to identify the installations affected within their borders under the aggregated 
reduction target. The additional ten countries (the so-called ascension nations) as well as Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway (non-EU European countries) also participate in the EU-ETS (see 
Williams and Kittel, 2004).  
 
Overall, about 12,000 installations with a minimum heat excess of 20 megawatts (MW) in a 
number of sectors within the EU (accounting for 40% of the EU’s total greenhouse gas 
emissions) are brought under the EU-ETS.4 European Union Allowance (EUA) is the trading 
permit unit (currency) in the EU-ETS, project based instruments are however permitted for 
submission to a specified degree, depending on the phase.5 Every April, the installations are 
required to submit EUAs equal to their verified net emissions for the preceding calendar 
(compliance) year6 (see Daskalakis et al., 2011 for a detailed financial overview of the EU-ETS).  
                                                          
4 The sectors affected are electricity generators, mineral oil refineries, coke ovens, ferrous metals, glass, ceramic 
products and cement manufacturers to glass and pulp producers. Electricity generators are however the leading CO2 
emitters. By Council decision, in 2012 the aviation sector was brought into the EU-ETS (Directive 2008/101/EC). 
A few other sectors are to be included from 2013 onwards. 
5 Project based permits include Certified Emission Reduction Units (CER) and Emission Reduction Units (ERU) 
from Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation (JI) respectively (see Daskalakis et al., 2011). 
6 we present results separately for each compliance period in our sample. 
 2.2.  Trading on the ECX 
The ECX is the largest carbon platform in the EU-ETS and by extension the world. In 2010, 
EUA carbon permits constituted more than 84% of global carbon market value with 
approximately 73% traded as futures contracts (see Kossoy and Ambrosi, 2010; Linacre et al., 
2011). The ECX platform is the market leader in EU-ETS exchange-based carbon trading with 
more than 92% market share. Market volumes have also increased significantly from year to year 
since trading started in 2005. It is a derivatives platform and most of the trading activities have 
consistently occurred in its December maturity contracts, Ibikunle et al. (2013) estimate that 
since 2009, at least 76% of the trading has occurred in the December contracts. The regular 
futures contracts are marketed on a quarterly expiry cycle: March, June, September and 
December. The underlying for each ECX EUA contract is 1,000 EUAs. The trading system is 
electronic and continuous. Official trading starts at 7:00hrs and ends at 17:00hrs UK local time 
from Monday to Friday. There is however, a pre-opening trading period of 15 minutes to allow 
for participants to place early orders in planning for the trading day. The market thus opens for 
an initial period between 6:45am and 7:00am, with virtually no executed orders. The maturity 
date for the contracts is the last Monday of the traded month with physical settlement occurring 
within three days following expiry. Carbon Financial Instruments (CFI) trading on the ICE ECX 
platform7 is done electronically on the ICE platform. ICE Futures Europe platform is accessible 
only to members for order placement. All valid orders and their corresponding executions are 
anonymous. The electronically executed trades pass through the so-called Trade Registration 
System (TRS) for account allocation.  
 
2.3.  Review of EU-ETS Literature on market efficiency and liquidity 
To the best of our knowledge, no study has been undertaken on the contemporaneous linkages 
between market efficiency and liquidity in the EU-ETS. Ibikunle et al. (2013) infer market 
                                                          
7 ICE ECX and ECX are used interchangeably in this paper. 
 efficiency from informational efficiency (the effectiveness of incorporating available information) 
on the ECX. They show that intraday evolution of market efficiency is contingent on trading 
activity, stopping short of linking long-term market efficiency to market liquidity. Their 
methodological approach is also different to ours. Several studies have made contributions to the 
understanding of microstructure properties of the EU-ETS instruments using various 
approaches. Joyeux and Milunovich (2010) examine issues related to market efficiency and price 
discovery during Phase I of the EU-ETS; they find intertemporal links between the spot and  
two futures contracts. Daskalakis et al. (2009) also find that spot and futures conform to cost of 
carry on intra-phase basis only. Daskalakis and Markellos (2008)  find that the market in Phase I 
did not conform to weak-form efficiency. The authors suggest that the lack of efficiency could 
be due to banking restrictions and immaturity of the market in Phase I. Montagnoli and de Vries 
(2010) also show that Phase I was an inefficient experiment, with thin trading leading to huge 
bias for EMH; the study goes on to examine trading in the early period of the second phase and 
report significant improvements in market efficiency.  
 
Benz and Klar (2008) provide the first insights into price discovery for the European carbon 
futures market. Using intraday data with the Engle and Granger (1987) VECM framework, they 
investigate estimated transaction costs in the now agreed inefficient Phase I (2005-2007) of the 
EU-ETS. In a study using identical methodologies, Rittler (2012) examines price discovery and 
information transmission in the early part of Phase II. The study aims to identify the price leader 
between the spot traded from Bluenext, Paris and futures contracts traded on the ECX, London. 
The two studies are similar not only in methodologies, but also in the direction of investigation. 
Benz and Klar (2008) focus on price leadership between two platforms (ECX and NordPool) in 
the EU-ETS; while Rittler (2012) on price leadership between two instruments (spot and futures 
contracts). The former concludes that the ECX leads price discovery and the latter concludes 
that futures leads price discovery. Mizrach and Otsubo (2011) also investigate the initiation of 
 price discovery between the Bluenext spot market in Paris and the ECX futures market in 
London using Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) information share estimation 
approaches. They report that the ECX is responsible for about a 90% share of combined price 
discovery for the two platforms.  
 
Regarding liquidity, Frino et al. (2010) investigate liquidity and transaction costs in the EU-ETS 
using intra-day data from the ECX, they find that aggregate long-term liquidity improves over 
the course of Phase I and during the early months of Phase II. Ibikunle et al. (2011) also examine 
liquidity evolution in Phase II. Using event study methodology with the market model, they 
show that liquidity and trading quality improve on account of new regulations for Phase II. 
 
3. Data 
In this paper, we compute all of order imbalance, liquidity and futures returns measures on an 
instrument-specific basis 8 . The use of instrument-specific variables for the examination of 
market efficiency is grounded in the microstructure literature (see for example Brennan et al., 
1993; Lo and MacKinlay, 1990). Serial dependence between days is approximately zero for 
dynamic instruments (see Chordia et al., 2005), which are too heavily traded for anomalies to 
exist for very long.  An examination of connections between liquidity and market efficiency on a 
platform such as the ECX, with actively traded instruments, should therefore be centred on 
intraday trading. The carbon futures order imbalance analysis of Mizrach and Otsubo (2011) 
using daily measures therefore will unlikely suffice. Since they focus on daily order imbalance, the 
results have no relevance for our research questions. We use 15-minute intervals as the focus of 
this study rather than the five-minute intervals used by other studies (see as examples Chordia et 
al., 2008; Chung and Hrazdil, 2010a; Chung and Hrazdil, 2010b) based on two conditions: 
                                                          
8 We employ this approach for all analyses unless otherwise stated. The properties of emissions-based data have 
been examined by Paolella and Taschini (2008) and Seifert et al. (2008), we apply the understanding their works 
provide in our use of the emissions permit data. 
  
1. Concerns about non-trading for less actively traded instruments on ECX. Since on EU-
ETS derivative trading platforms, the nearest maturity contracts usually account for 
about 80% of trades in emission permits, non-trading therefore is taken into account by 
extending the interval to 15 minutes. 
 
2. Theoretically, a predictive connection between order imbalances and returns should not 
endure for more than minutes, since market inefficiencies create arbitrage opportunities. 
Trading activities on account of this in turn leads to regained market efficiency. Hence, 
while non-trading remains an issue, the time interval chosen must be short enough to 
capture the inefficiencies in trading activity.  This informs the decision not to extend the 
interval beyond 15 minutes. 
 
Based on the foregoing and the problem of determining serial dependence in the presence of 
non-trading, we restrict our analysis to instruments that are traded relatively frequently for a 
specific compliance year9. We also follow Chordia et al. (2001) in excluding instruments with 
differing trading characteristics to the major CFIs traded on the exchange. Thus we exclude 
EUA Daily futures and EUA spreads. Ultimately, only five EUA futures contracts with varying 
trading years are retained in the sample, these are the December expiry contracts for 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011 and 2012. The December maturity contracts account for more than 76% of daily 
trading volume on the ECX for the period under investigation. The dataset obtained directly 
from the ICE/ECX London comprises of all intra-day tick-by-tick ECX EUA futures contracts 
on-screen trades on the ECX platform from January 2008 through April 2011. The dataset 
contains date, timestamp, market identifier, product description, traded month, order identifier, 
trade sign (bid/offer), traded price, quantity traded, parent identifier and trade type. The dataset 
                                                          
9 If we applied 5 minute-intervals as the basis for the measures, we would have been forced to examine only one 
contract per year for the period under consideration, thus we use 15-minute intervals. 
 is split into four compliance periods of Phase II, the 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 compliance 
years. Tick size for the entire period is €0.01 having been changed from €0.05 on 27th March 
2007 (during Phase I). The division based on regulatory compliance periods is exogenous and 
provides for a practical basis to examine the effect of liquidity on return predictability. 
 
3.1.  Order Imbalance and Return Measures 
We begin our enquiry by computing the variables employed for most of this paper. In the dataset, 
all the trades are labelled as either buyer initiated or seller initiated, hence we do not need to 
algorithmically allocate trade classifications. We use two order imbalance methods based on 
nominal trades and the euro weight of trades respectively. Nominal order imbalance (OIBQt) for 
each CFI and for each 15-minute interval is calculated using equation (1), while the euro order 
imbalance (OIB€t) is simply the weighing of (1) with euro trading value of the trades as shown in 
equation (2).10 The nominal order imbalance is non-weighted and thus fails to account for the 
economic significance of the trades unlike the euro order imbalance measure, for most of the 
analysis; we therefore employ the latter measure of order imbalance.   
                                                                         (1) 
 
 
                                                        (2)  
For each CFI, the measures are calculated for every 15-minute interval in a trading day. In 
computing the 15-minute returns variable, we use the last transaction prices for every 15-minute 
period11. Although returns are viewed as being less biased when computed from quotes than 
from transaction prices, we face two challenges in computing from quotes. First, heterogeneities 
                                                          
10 We also examine the possibility that our order imbalance measures may reflect exogenous shocks by computing 
absolute values for liquid and low liquidity periods as described in page 259 of Chordia et al. (2008) for robustness. 
11 We also use the mid-point of the last bid and ask transaction prices for every 15-minute period with similar 
outcomes. 
 exist for trading rates of occurrence for CFIs on the ECX as a result of the high level of differing 
trading frequencies. Potentially, the results will be extremely biased and contradictory since the 
method could result in returns computed over various spans for different CFIs. One needs to 
also be mindful that computing returns with transaction prices could be affected by bid-ask 
bounce. However, the summary statistics of trading prices for each of the four compliance 
periods suggests that this is not a significant source of concern in the ECX dataset. Also, since 
our analyses are based on contract-specific measures, we mitigate the problem of non-
synchronicity. In addition, when a contract fails to trade at t-1, we do not use it in constructing 
market aggregate measure at time t. We therefore employ the transaction prices for computing 
the return variable for each fifteen-minute period such that the return for 10.15am is computed 
using the last trade at 10:00am and the last trade at 10:15am. For all analyses utilising lagged 
estimates, the earliest 15-minute interval for each trading session/day is removed since it is 
connected to the lagged interval of the foregoing trading session. 
 
3.2.  Liquidity Measures 
We adopt two measures of short-term liquidity constructed using transaction prices at regular 15-
minute intervals. Relative spread, which is the main measure of liquidity used, is given as the 
best/highest traded bid price minus the best/lowest traded ask price, then divided by the average 
of the best traded bid and best traded ask price for every 15-minute period. Traded spread, the 
second measure of liquidity employed, is defined as the best traded bid price minus the best 
traded ask price over the same interval12. The traded spread is computed for use in robustness 
analysis and most of the results for it are not presented in this paper. 
 
Contract-specific daily bid-ask spread measures are first computed, and then aggregated cross-
sectionally across the CFI samples to obtain a market-wide liquidity value. Four exogenous 
                                                          
12 We also compute the measures with traded bid and ask prices at the stroke of each 15-minute period, the results 
are very similar with no material variation in value.  
 liquidity periods are identified based on compliance periods available in Phase II of the EU-ETS. 
The sample thus span forty months of trading based on available data. Period (i) runs from 2nd 
January 2008 until December 31st 2008; period (ii) from 2nd January 2009 until December 31st 
2009; period (iii) from 4th January 2010 until December 31st, 2010 and period (iv) from 3rd 
January 2011 until April 29th 2011. Period (iv) is restricted by data availability for this study. The 
four periods correspond to Phase II-Year I, Phase II-Year II, Phase II-Year III and Phase II-
Year IV respectively. Since they jointly represent two-thirds of Phase II, they have a good degree 
of representativeness. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1.  Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for traded spread, relative spread, market returns and the two 
order imbalance measures. The samples are representative of values for all the contracts 
examined in the assigned periods, with the exclusion of those missing observations (i.e. when no 
trading occurs). The statistics clearly show a strong improvement in liquidity over the four 
compliance periods. The mean traded and relative spread measures for Phase II-Year I are 
€0.1197 and €0.0043 respectively. These decrease substantially by 74% and 56% to €0.031374 
and €0.001918 in Year IV for the traded and relative spreads respectively. Order imbalance 
measures generally increase in magnitude, progressing from negative territory (-0.005787, €-
0.08279) in Year I to positive values in the Year IV (0.02042, €0.002767) for OIBQt and OIB€t 
respectively.  The statistics are somewhat similar to those of Chordia et al. (2008) and thus show 
a market with increasing ratio of bid trades to ask trades. Most efficient markets record more bid 
than ask trades, since arbitrage traders operate from neutral positions, from which they bid for 
opportunities. The data thus imply an improvement in level of market efficiency for the ECX 
with each progression to a different compliance year. We further test this hypothesis in 
subsequent sections of this paper. Another interesting observation that serves to underscore this 
 suggestion, as well as further cementing findings of other studies on the improving returns on 
the ECX (see for example Ibikunle et al., 2012), is the marked improvements in the returns from 
Year I to Year IV. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2.  Correlations 
Table 2 shows correlation coefficients for lags of the two order imbalance measures and the 
futures returns. The order imbalance measures, as one would expect are clearly highly correlated 
except for in Year I, however all are statistically significant at 1% level. The return is not as 
highly correlated with the order imbalance measures; in fact we record statistically significant 
negative correlations for Year II, which is surprising. For other periods and for the OIBQt 
measure, the correlation coefficients are positive and also statistically significant. For OIB€t, only 
the Year III returns a coefficient that is not statistically significant at all levels tested. The initial 
expectation here is that of high correlation of returns with the order imbalance measures. 
Although this is not the case, the correlation analysis results are by no means conclusive evidence 
of the link between returns and order imbalance on the ECX. It is very important to understand 
that while there are already several investment vehicles on the carbon trading platform, the main 
aim of the market is not for wealth creation, but rather to establish an emission-constrained 
economy. This simple fact complicates the picture for the relationship (market efficiency and 
liquidity) we are investigating. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
4.3.  Predictive Regressions, Market efficiency and Liquidity 
We employ Chordia et al.’s (2008) returns predictability model (3) to estimate the level of short-
horizon efficiency. If Rett is the contract return and OrderImbalancet corresponds to either of 
OIBQt or OIB€t, then; 
  
                                                                                (3) 
 
Based on results of the correlation analysis, the expectations for the predictive regressions are 
not very clear. Table 3 reports results for the predictive regressions of 15-minute returns on lag 
order imbalance measures. Panel A shows the results for regressions run with the OIBQt measure 
and Panel B for the OIB€t measure. The results are not stable across the various periods for both 
regressions. For the regressions run with the entire sample, the results suggest that on the ECX, 
lagged order imbalance is not a significant predictor for short-run returns and this is consistent 
for both order imbalance measures. However, different findings are obtained for the period-
based results. For example, in Panel A: for Years I, III and IV the OIBQt coefficients (levels of 
statistical significance) are 0.000325 (10%), 0.000368 (5%) and 0.000441 (5%) respectively. The 
R2 for the two periods are respectively 0.025%, 0.022% and 0.0054% respectively. Similarly, and 
more significantly, in four of the periods considered using the OIB€t measure, Panel B reports 
statistically significant coefficients for three of the periods. In Years I, II and IV of Phase II 
trading, the OIB€t coefficients (significance levels) are 0.000582(5%), 0.000547(10%) and 
0.000436 (10%) respectively. The R2 values for the three periods are respectively 0.023%, 0.02% 
and 0.009%. Thus, if the overall estimates for the forty-month period examined are not 
considered, we can see the influence of order imbalances in the determination of market returns. 
It is evident that this explanatory power decreases with each passing period, which is consistent 
with Chordia et al. (2008). These results indicate that the market efficiency improves over the 
period under examination.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Considering the trading frequency on the ECX and the intervals of 15-minutes examined, these 
values are substantial and provide a basis to explore further the hypothesis that lagged order 
 imbalance influences short-run returns. Since there is a suggestion of period dependency to the 
estimates, we examine next how market efficiency has evolved over the four periods. We run 
monthly predictive regressions for the forty months under observation, starting with January 
2008 and ending with April 2011. We use the OIB€t as the sole order imbalance measure, since it 
represents the economic significance of the trading imbalance and its results in Table 3 are more 
significant. From this point on, for consistency, we focus on the use of only OIB€t. We expect 
that as market efficiency improves, the power of order imbalance in predicting short-run returns 
diminishes; hence R2 values are expected to drop progressively over the entire period. Figure 1 
shows a plot of the monthly regressions R2 values and t-statistics for the entire period. The plot 
shows the R2, decreasing from a height of 1.4831% in September of 2008 to 0.0004% in 
February, 2011. The t-statistic values have remained largely stable within the positive territory, 
especially over the April 2009-April 2011 period. The values hit the peak of 3.81 in February 
2008 and ends with 1.08 in April 2011. The t-statistics and the R2 values have a Spearman’s 
correlation estimate of 0.38. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
In keeping with Chordia et al. (2008) and Chung and Hrazdil (2010a), we next examine the 
connections between liquidity and market efficiency which is the main object of this study. We 
employ OIBQ€t and the relative spread measure.  First, we examine the evolution of liquidity 
over the entire period. Figure 2 presents the time series plot of relative spread over the forty-
month period under observation13. Conspicuously, there is a sustained narrowing of the market 
spread over the entire period, suggesting that liquidity improves with time on the ECX. Further, 
                                                          
13 The traded spread yields a similar plot. Further, we employ the traded spread in all other sections of this paper for 
robustness examinations. In all instances, the results yielded are not materially different from the ones yielded by our 
use of the relative spread. The results presented in this paper are thus robust to substitute liquidity proxies. 
 there seems to be a blip noticeable about the start of trading for each period. This shows a 
temporary loss of liquidity, perhaps present as a result of some form of calendar effect14.  
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
For robustness, we employ two other measures of liquidity based on price impact ratios, these 
measures are taken based on the argument that, for any given volume of trading, the price 
response will be greater in illiquid markets. We employ both the Amihud (2002) and the 
Florackis et al. (2011) measures of long term illiquidity. The Amihud (2002) and Florackis et al. 
(2011) ratios are given as equations (4) and (5) below respectively: 
 
                                                                                                        (4) 
 
                                                                                                   (5), 
 
where Ritd, Vitd and TRitd are the return, euro volume and turnover ratio of EUA futures contract i 
on day d at month t and Dit is the number of trading days in month t for EUA futures i; therefore 
larger values indicate that the market is less liquid The results for the long-term evolution of 
liquidity using (4) and (5) are presented in Figure 3. It can be seen that the evolution is consistent 
with Figure 2.  
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In reference to Blume et al. (1989) and Cox and Peterson (1994), the impact of illiquidity is more 
significant during periods of very low liquidity. In view of this and in order to maintain 
consistency with Chordia et al. (2008), we split the days in our sample based on those that are 
                                                          
14 Ibikunle et al. (2011), using the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985), examine calendar effects on the 
European Energy Exchange (EEX) carbon platform  and find no significant effect. We nevertheless apply several 
dummy regressions to capture effects of specific dates in further analyses. 
 considered liquid and those that are relatively illiquid. The illiquid days are defined as those 
whose average relative spread for that day is at least one standard deviation above the mean 
relative spread for a surrounding period over (-30, +30)15.  
 
In Table 4, we present descriptive statistics for relative spreads on high and low liquidity days 
over the 40-month period. The general trend is that the number of illiquid days as a proportion 
of the total number of trading days in the respective periods decreases from year to year. In 
Phase II-Years I, II, III and IV16 for example, the proportion of illiquid days as percentages of 
total number of trading days are 13.58%, 12.89%, 10.87% and 9.33% respectively. The gradual 
improvement evident here is consistent with Figures 2 and 3. If considered in tandem with 
Figure 1, provides evidence for the hypothesis that market efficiency improves when the market 
is more liquid17. The next logical step is to empirically examine the foregoing hypothesis on the 
ECX, which is examining the impact of liquidity on market efficiency. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
In order to empirically analyse the effect of liquidity on the evolution of market efficiency, we 
interact the OIB€t variable (in Table 3) with a low-liquidity day dummy. For every day when the 
average relative spread is at least one standard deviation above the mean relative spread for a 
                                                          
15 We also employ the (-60, +60) window as used by Chung and Hrazdil (2010a), with no substantial differences in 
the number of liquid and illiquid days. For robustness, we econometrically estimate effective half-spread for days in 
a randomly selected month in each year using the Huang and Stoll (1997) spread decomposition model. The 
distribution of liquid/illiquid days observed is not qualitatively dissimilar to the one we use above. 
16 In Year IV, the 7 illiquid days have lower spread values than the liquid days. This underscores the limitations to 
our definition of illiquid days, which we control for by using another window and seeing very small qualitative 
difference in the distribution of illiquid days. Suppose we have a period of low spreads leading to April (when 
compliance traders must submit emission permits) as a result of perceived increase in trading activity, and suppose 
most of our illiquid days are around this period. Then we are likely to obtain ‘illiquid’ days with lower average spread 
than the average of the vastly larger number of liquid days. This is plausible since our definition of illiquidity is 
relative to only a given number of surrounding days in the year for every illiquid day. Moreover, the differences in 
the values are so small that they are not statistically different from one another, even at the 10% level. The same case 
is made for the mean values in Year III. 
17 The percentage proportion of median relative spread on illiquid days to liquid days for Years I, II, III and IV are 
119%, 125%, 101% and 90% respectively. These values (except for Year IV for which we have data for only 1/3 of 
the year) square with the expectation that the average spread for low liquidity days will be higher than that of liquid 
days. 
 surrounding period over (-30, +30), the dummy takes on the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. If ILDt 
corresponds to the low liquidity dummy on day t, then model (3) becomes;  
 
                        (6) 
 
The regression model (6) is thus run such that on low liquidity days, the lagged OIB€t variable 
with the dummy interaction becomes OIB€t-1 and 0 on other days18. In Table 5, we present the 
results for the regression analysis. In this analysis, we focus on the significance of the interaction 
variable. As in Panel B of Table 3, the Phase II-Year III period does not conform to the general 
trend observed for the other periods. The coefficients for three of the examined periods are 
positive and statistically significant.  For Phase II-Year I, the coefficient (t-statistic) is 
0.003341(4.05) and significant at 1% level. Also for Phase II-Year II, the coefficient (t-statistic) is 
0.003313 (3.80) and significant at 1% level. The trend holds also for the final year under 
consideration, Phase II-Year IV, with coefficient (t-statistic) at 0.0021 (2.23) and statistically 
significant at 5% level. The highest coefficient value is recorded for Year I, it decreases from 
then on until a slight rise in Year IV. One reason that could be advanced for the deviation of 
Year III (2010) from other periods is that 2010 was the post Copenhagen year. 2010 was a year 
of big disappointment after the UN Conference Parties failed to reach an agreement on a 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol, as was widely expected in the build-up to the December 2009 
Copenhagen conference. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The coefficients on lagged order imbalance are all statistically insignificant.  This implies that 
where lagged order imbalance is found to affect / predict returns, it does so only when the 
                                                          
18 We also carry out robustness tests by including dummies for specific day-after events such as the submission of 
annual emission reports, NAP and annual emission results announcements. We also include dummies for days 
preceding specific holidays in the U.K. The resultant coefficients show that the events are not significant to our 
investigations on intraday basis; also our earlier results are not materially altered.   
 market is illiquid.  Results in Table 5 show that this finding on illiquidity and lagged order flow 
explains a greater proportion of variation in returns.  The R2 values decrease from Year I to Year 
IV. For example, in Year I, the R2 is 0.0038, but by Year IV, this has diminished to 0.000451. 
This decline observed in the explanatory power of the periodic models and their significance is 
consistent with the gradual improvement in liquidity reported in Figures 2, 3 and in Table 1. 
Adjustments in liquidity thus affect levels of market efficiency.   
 
Exogenous impacts can lead to extreme order imbalances, which can in turn result in a loss of 
liquidity. Thus in our analysis, using the low liquidity dummy on OIB€t to determine impact of 
liquidity, instead of capturing the effect of liquidity in improving market efficiency, we may well 
have been picking up the impact of exogenous shocks. We therefore construct absolute order 
imbalances for liquid and illiquid periods following the method of Chordia et al. (2008) in order 
to examine this possibility. We construct these measures for all the four periods and find only 
minimal variations across both the liquid and illiquid days. This result, along with several other 
checks mentioned in the footnotes, implies that our results indeed capture the real role of 
liquidity in improving market efficiency. In any case, as Chordia et al. (2008) point out, it is 
illogical to assume that illiquidity is jointly determined with signed order imbalances. If an 
illiquidity-inducing event that is exogenous to the market does occur, one should expect to see as 
less of buy orders as sell orders. 
 
4.4.  Granger Causality Analyses 
 As an additional check of robustness and to further explore the notion that narrowing spreads 
on day t results in improved market efficiency on day t+1, we carry out Granger causality tests 
(see Granger, 1969). We thus examine the hypothesis that past values of the liquidity proxy are 
able to explain variation in current market efficiency. This is undertaken by estimating a vector 
autoregressive model (VAR), in this case with two dependent variables. The first, φ, is the daily 
 relative spread liquidity proxy.  The second, δ, denotes the daily mean of the 15-minute Euro 
order imbalance measure for each EUA futures contract traded.19  The lag length, l, is chosen to 
purge autocorrelation. This results in a model of the following form: 
 
              . 
 
                                            (7) 
 
The equations in model 7 are estimated simultaneously for each of the four periods.  The 
statistics presented in Table 6 are the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis: 
                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                            (8) 
 
for each of the equations in (7). The null tested is that δ does not Granger-cause φ in the top 
equation and that φ does not Granger-cause δ in the bottom equation. We run these estimates on 
a contract-specific basis for each period; the results are presented in Panel A of Table 6. 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Panel A shows that the hypothesis that liquidity improvements on a given day do not inform market 
efficiency formation during the next is strongly rejected for all tested contracts for the first three 
periods. For the fourth period, which includes trading data for only 82 days of trading, we 
cannot reject this hypothesis. There is also evidence of two-way causation in respect to the Dec-
2009 (Year II), Dec-2010 (Year III), Dec-2011 (Year III) and the Dec-2012 (Year III) EUA 
futures contracts. Broadly therefore, the evidence of two-way causation cannot be conclusively 
established since it affects contracts only in specific periods. Further, the same contracts are not 
affected uniformly across all the periods in which they are tested. In order to explore further the 
                                                          
19 Sufficient trading of the instrument must have taken place for it to enter the sample. 
 possibility of bi-directional causality in futures contracts, we also run the VAR on contract-
specific basis without recourse to periods. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 6. Again, 
there is substantial evidence of Granger causality running from liquidity to order imbalance; 
however two-way causation is only observed in the case of the Dec-2012 contract. Thus, the 
evidence in Table 6 confirms further our overriding hypothesis that liquidity on emissions permit 
trading platforms results in more efficient trading. 
 
4.5.  Variance Ratios: Measuring randomness of returns 
The main premise of this paper is that the predictability of intraday (short-run) return from order 
imbalances (order flow) is an inverse measure of market efficiency. Chordia et al. (2008) propose 
another procedure involving the measuring of randomness of returns series. This requires the 
comparison of variance ratios over short and long horizons. The variances of long-horizon 
returns are divided by the variance estimated for returns over shorter intervals. For a market in 
harmony with the random walk process, the variance of returns measured over longer horizons 
is equal to the sum of variances of shorter horizon returns as long as the summation of the 
shorter horizons are equal to that of the longer horizon. Thus, variance of the longer horizon 
returns is η times the variance of returns measured over shorter horizons, if η is the number of 
short horizon periods in the longer horizon. Based on our earlier results, we maintain the 
hypothesis that during liquid spells, there will be fewer deviations from random walk 
benchmarks, i.e. the variance ratios will be closer to one for each instrument. We concede the 
point made by Grossman and Miller (1988) that divergence from random walk can be induced 
by inventory related issues due to return serial correlation, however in a largely efficient market; 
arbitrage opportunities created by this deviation will lure participants into providing the required 
liquidity. Hence the divergence from a random walk will be very much temporary, even if market 
makers cannot absorb orders. 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 For each instrument within each period, we compute 15-minute returns as described in section 3 
and also for open to close for all trading days. We then compute the variance ratio by multiplying 
the 15-minute return variance by the number of 15-minute periods in a trading day. In a market 
conforming to the random walk process, the variance ratio values will be close to one. Table 7 
presents the results of the Variance ratio analysis for contracts traded in each period as well as 
value weighted variance ratios for each period. The weight employed is the total trading value per 
instrument. As expected, consistent with Figure 2 and Table 1, the overall variance ratio values 
decrease progressively from 3.74 in Phase II-Year I to 1.39 in Year III and picked up slightly to 
1.42 in first four months of Year IV. It is therefore evident that as the market becomes more 
liquid and the EUA futures contracts are traded faster with minimal impact on their prices, the 
market approaches a variance ratio of unity i.e. conforms more to the random walk process. The 
hypothesis that liquidity contributes to an efficient market in emission permit trading markets is 
therefore once again confirmed. Another interesting trend in Table 7 is the propensity for the 
least traded contracts during a specific period to have the highest variance ratios. For example, in 
Year I, the Dec-2010 contract is the least traded and has a ratio of 16.61, more than seven times 
the value for the most traded contract in Year I (Dec-2008). The ratio disparity is however less 
severe in later years, for example the Dec-2012 ratio in Year III is only about twice the value of 
that of the Dec-2010 contract. The results all therefore support the expectation that divergence 
from random walk benchmarks is less severe if markets are liquid.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The EU-ETS represents the largest emissions trading experiment in the world.  Although there 
are now a few other compulsory schemes elsewhere, the success of the ETS second phase would 
still provide a strong impetus in the formation of a truly global climate change policy. Our work 
contributes to the understanding of this market and provides evidence of its workability, in this 
paper we focus on efficiency. Returns predictability on an efficient market should be momentary, 
 infrequent and in the event it occurs, arbitrageurs should provide the necessary pool for order 
absorption. In this paper, we investigate the predictability of returns from intraday order flows 
across forty months of trading on the world’s largest emissions trading platform. We provide 
evidence that while return predictability occurs on the platform; this has significantly decreased 
since the start of Phase II in 2008 and continues to decline over the entire period investigated. 
The prices of each instrument are thus closer to the random walk benchmark as the scheme 
evolves. Taking the assumption that loss of market efficiency leads to arbitrage openings, one 
can then conclude that arbitrage activities, especially in periods of high liquidity, lead to more 
efficient markets. Inherently we provide the first evidence that for emission permit trading 
platforms, liquidity enhances market efficiency. The importance of our study is further 
underscored by the fact that the cost of hedging increases when efficiency decreases in futures 
markets (see Krehbiel and Adkins, 1993). 
 
The ECX is the most liquid platform in the EU-ETS and in the world. For future research, it 
would therefore be interesting to examine return predictability in relation to liquidity on the less 
liquid platforms as well.    
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 Table 2: Correlations for 15-minute trading intervals on the ECX 
The table shows correlations values for three variables. OIBQt is the difference between number buyer initiated 
trades and seller initiated trades, divided by total trades over every 15-minute interval in a trading day. OIB€t is given 
as the Euro value of buyer initiated trades less Euro value of seller initiated trades, then divided by the total Euro 
value of trades over the same interval. The return is computed for every 15-minute interval using the last trade at 
every interval. t is the aggregate number of 15 minute intervals for all the instruments. The data is for Phase II of the 
EU-ETS, and spans 2nd January, 2008-29th April, 2011. The data includes December maturity EUA futures contracts 
traded during the period. ***, ** and * represents statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  Return OIBQt-1 
Whole Sample (2008-2011) OIBQt-1 0.006   
t= 58,836 OIB€t-1 0.002 0.53*** 
       
Phase II, Year I OIBQt-1 0.02*   
t= 14,125 OIB€t-1 0.02* 0.39*** 
       
Phase II, Year II OIBQt-1 -0.007*   
t= 18,550 OIB€t-1 -0.014* 0.80*** 
       
Phase II, Year III OIBQt-1  0.02**   
t= 21,239 OIB€t-1 0.01 0.64*** 
       
Phase II, Year IV OIBQt-1 0.02   
t= 4,922 OIB€t-1 0.03** 0.55*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Predictive regressions of 15-min returns on lagged Order Imbalance  
Panel A shows results for 15-min predictive regressions for EUA Futures contracts on the ECX. OIBQt-1 is the 
difference between number buyer initiated trades and seller initiated trades, divided by total trades over the 15-
minute interval, t-1. The Rett, computed for every 15-minute interval using the last trade at every interval is the return 
at interval, t. Panel B shows results for 15-min predictive regressions for EUA Futures contracts on the ECX. OIB€t-
1 is given as the Euro value of buyer initiated trades less Euro value of seller initiated trades, then divided by the total 
Euro value of trades over the 15-minute interval, t-1. The Rett, computed for every 15-minute interval, using the last 
trade at every interval, is the return at interval, t. The following regression is thus estimated: 
 
 
 
The data used is for Phase II of the EU-ETS, and spans 2nd January 2008-29th April 2011. The data includes 
December maturity EUA futures contracts traded during the period. 
 
 
Panel A 
 
Dependent Variable: Rett 
Whole Sample (2008-2011) Coefficient t-Statistic Probability   
Intercept 3.47*10-06 0.13 0.90  
OIBQt-1 1.81*10
-04 1.46 0.14  
R-squared    3.60*10-05 
     
Phase II, Year I     
Intercept -5.09*10-05 -0.84 0.40  
OIBQt-1 3.25*10
-04 1.77 0.08  
R-squared    2.53*10-04 
     
Phase II, Year II     
Intercept -1.23*10-05 -0.19 0.85  
OIBQt-1 3.56*10
-06 1.00 0.32  
R-squared    2.44*10-04 
     
Phase II, Year III     
Intercept 2.69*10-05 1.19 0.23  
OIBQt-1 3.68*10
-04 2.32 0.02  
R-squared    2.22*10-04 
     
Phase II, Year IV     
Intercept 7.54*10-05 2.08 0.04  
OIBQt-1 4.41*10
-04 2.10 0.03  
R-squared    5.40*10-05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel B 
 
Dependent Variable: Rett 
Whole Sample (2008-2011) Coefficient t-Statistic Probability   
Intercept -1.74*10-06 -0.07 0.95  
OIB€t-1 5.90*10
-05 0.46 0.65  
R-squared    4.00*10-06 
     
Phase II, Year I     
Intercept -8.28*10-05 -2.34 0.02  
OIB€t-1 5.82*10
-06 2.07 0.04  
R-squared    2.29*10-04 
     
Phase II, Year II     
Intercept -8.39*10-06 -0.14 0.89  
OIB€t-1 5.47*10
-04 1.84 0.07  
R-squared    1.83*10-04 
     
Phase II, Year III     
Intercept 1.96*10-05 0.88 0.38  
OIB€t-1 1.82*10
-04 1.36 0.18  
R-squared    8.70*10-05 
     
Phase II, Year IV     
Intercept -1.67*10-05 -0.26 0.79  
OIB€t-1 4.36*10
-04 1.80 0.07  
R-squared    8.68*10-05 
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D
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s 
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26
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 T
ab
le
 7
: D
ai
ly
 v
ar
ia
nc
e 
ra
tio
s 
Th
is 
Ta
bl
e 
sh
ow
s c
on
tra
ct
-s
pe
ci
fic
 ra
tio
 o
f 1
5-
m
in
ut
e 
re
tu
rn
 v
ar
ian
ce
 to
 o
pe
n-
to
-c
lo
se
 re
tu
rn
 v
ar
ian
ce
, s
ca
le
d 
by
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f 1
5-
m
in
ut
e 
in
te
rv
als
 in
 a
 tr
ad
in
g 
da
y 
on
 th
e 
E
CX
. 
Th
e 
fin
al 
ro
w
 in
 th
e 
ta
bl
e 
is 
th
e 
tra
di
ng
 v
alu
e-
w
ei
gh
te
d 
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
va
ria
nc
e 
ra
tio
 p
er
 p
er
io
d.
 D
at
a 
is 
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s T
ab
le
 1
. *
**
, *
* 
an
d 
* 
de
no
te
 v
alu
es
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly 
di
ff
er
en
t 
fr
om
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
ye
ar
’s
 v
al
ue
 a
t 
1%
, 5
%
 a
nd
 1
0%
 le
ve
ls
 r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 T
he
 d
at
a 
us
ed
 is
 f
or
 P
ha
se
 I
I 
of
 t
he
 E
U
-E
TS
, a
nd
 sp
an
s 2
nd
 Ja
nu
ar
y, 
20
08
-2
9t
h  A
pr
il,
 2
01
1.
 T
he
 
va
ria
bl
es
 a
re
 c
om
pu
te
d 
fr
om
 D
ec
em
be
r m
at
ur
ity
 E
U
A
 fu
tu
re
s c
on
tra
ct
s t
ra
de
d 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
pe
rio
d.
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D
ec
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01
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.6
1 
3.
13
**
* 
1.
08
**
* 
 
D
ec
-2
01
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5.
68
 
1.
96
**
* 
1.
43
* 
D
ec
-2
01
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2.
44
 
1.
37
 *
* 
V
alu
e 
w
ei
gh
te
d 
ov
er
all
 
3.
74
 
3.
22
 
1.3
9 
1.4
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 Fi
gu
re
 1:
 M
ar
ke
t E
ffi
ci
en
cy
 m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 15
-m
in
ut
e 
re
tu
rn
 p
re
di
ct
io
ns
 w
ith
 15
-m
in
ut
e 
la
gg
ed
 E
ur
o 
O
rd
er
 Im
ba
la
nc
e 
Th
e 
fig
ur
e 
sh
ow
s t
he
 p
lo
t o
f p
re
di
ct
iv
e 
R
2 s
 a
nd
 c
or
re
sp
on
di
ng
 t-
st
at
ist
ics
 o
bt
ain
ed
 fr
om
 m
on
th
ly
 re
gr
es
sio
ns
 u
sin
g 
15
-m
in
 p
re
di
ct
iv
e 
re
gr
es
sio
ns
 fo
r E
U
A
 F
ut
ur
es
 c
on
tra
ct
s o
n 
th
e 
E
CX
. O
rd
er
Im
ba
la
nc
e€
t-1
 is
 g
iv
en
 a
s t
he
 E
ur
o 
va
lu
e 
of
 b
uy
er
 in
iti
at
ed
 tr
ad
es
 le
ss
 E
ur
o 
va
lu
e 
of
 se
lle
r i
ni
tia
te
d 
tra
de
s, 
th
en
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
to
ta
l E
ur
o 
va
lu
e 
of
 tr
ad
es
 o
ve
r t
he
 1
5-
m
in
ut
e 
in
te
rv
al,
 t-
1.
 T
he
 R
et t
 c
om
pu
te
d 
fo
r e
ve
ry
 1
5-
m
in
ut
e 
in
te
rv
al 
us
in
g 
th
e 
las
t t
ra
de
 a
t e
ve
ry
 in
te
rv
al 
is 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 a
t i
nt
er
va
l, 
t. 
Th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
re
gr
es
sio
n 
is 
th
us
 e
st
im
at
ed
: 
 
 
Th
e 
da
ta
 is
 fo
r P
ha
se
 II
 o
f t
he
 E
U
-E
TS
, a
nd
 s
pa
ns
 2
nd
 Ja
nu
ar
y, 
20
08
-2
9t
h  A
pr
il,
 2
01
1.
 T
he
 d
at
a 
in
cl
ud
es
 D
ec
em
be
r m
at
ur
ity
 E
U
A
 fu
tu
re
s c
on
tra
ct
s t
ra
de
d 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
pe
rio
d.
 N
ot
e 
th
at
 n
on
e 
of
 th
e 
R2
 v
alu
es
 is
 a
ct
ua
lly
 z
er
o.
 
 
 
 
 Fi
gu
re
 2
: D
ai
ly
 A
ve
ra
ge
 T
ra
de
d 
sp
re
ad
 a
nd
 R
el
at
iv
e 
sp
re
ad
 fo
r E
CX
, 2
00
8-
20
12
 
Th
e 
Fi
gu
re
 sh
ow
s t
he
 p
lo
t o
f d
ail
y 
av
er
ag
e 
of
 li
qu
id
ity
 m
ea
su
re
s, 
tra
de
d 
sp
re
ad
 a
nd
 re
lat
iv
e 
sp
re
ad
. T
ra
de
d 
sp
re
ad
 (T
SP
R)
 is
 th
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 o
f b
es
t t
ra
de
d 
bi
d 
an
d 
as
k 
pr
ic
es
 fo
r 
ev
er
y 
15
-m
in
ut
e 
pe
rio
d;
 re
lat
iv
e 
sp
re
ad
 (R
SP
R)
 is
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s t
he
 b
es
t t
ra
de
d 
bi
d 
m
in
us
 th
e 
be
st
 tr
ad
ed
 a
sk
 p
ric
e, 
th
en
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
of
 th
e 
be
st
 tr
ad
ed
 b
id
 a
nd
 b
es
t a
sk
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
in
te
rv
als
. T
he
 sp
re
ad
s a
re
 a
ve
ra
ge
d 
ac
ro
ss
 th
e 
da
y 
fo
r e
ac
h 
in
st
ru
m
en
t a
nd
 c
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
na
lly
 a
cr
os
s a
ll 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
. T
he
 d
at
a 
is 
fo
r P
ha
se
 II
 o
f t
he
 E
U
-E
TS
, a
nd
 sp
an
s 2
nd
 
Ja
nu
ar
y, 
20
08
-2
9t
h  A
pr
il,
 2
01
1.
 T
he
 d
at
a 
in
cl
ud
es
 D
ec
em
be
r m
at
ur
ity
 E
U
A
 fu
tu
re
s c
on
tra
ct
s t
ra
de
d 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
pe
rio
d.
 
 
 
  
 Fi
gu
re
 3
: M
on
th
ly
 Il
liq
ui
di
ty
/P
ric
e 
Im
pa
ct
 R
at
io
s 
Th
e 
fig
ur
e 
sh
ow
s t
he
 p
lo
t o
f m
on
th
ly
 c
om
pu
te
d 
ill
iq
ui
di
ty
 ra
tio
s o
f A
m
ih
ud
 (2
00
2)
 a
nd
 F
lo
ra
ck
is 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
1)
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
ely
 g
iv
en
 b
el
ow
 a
s (
i) 
an
d 
(ii
): 
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  (
ii)
, 
 w
he
re
 R
itd
, V
itd
 a
nd
 T
R i
td
 a
re
 th
e 
re
tu
rn
, e
ur
o 
vo
lu
m
e 
an
d 
tu
rn
ov
er
 ra
tio
 o
f E
U
A
 fu
tu
re
s c
on
tra
ct
 i 
on
 d
ay
 d
 a
t m
on
th
 t 
an
d 
D
it i
s t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f t
ra
di
ng
 d
ay
s i
n 
m
on
th
 t 
fo
r E
U
A
 
fu
tu
re
s i
. T
he
 ra
tio
s a
re
 a
ve
ra
ge
d 
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
na
lly
 a
cr
os
s a
ll 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
. T
he
 d
at
a 
is 
fo
r P
ha
se
 II
 o
f t
he
 E
U
-E
TS
, a
nd
 sp
an
s 2
nd
 Ja
nu
ar
y, 
20
08
-2
9t
h  A
pr
il,
 2
01
1.
 T
he
 d
at
a 
in
cl
ud
es
 
D
ec
em
be
r m
at
ur
ity
 E
U
A
 fu
tu
re
s c
on
tra
ct
s t
ra
de
d 
on
 th
e 
E
CX
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pe
rio
d.
 
 
 
